

# FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

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## Disarmament and the Five Naval Powers

THE definite assurance that the three-power naval conference proposed by President Coolidge will meet in Geneva early in June has given added significance in the United States to the meeting of the League of Nations' Preparatory Commission, which reconvened at Geneva on March 21 to continue its work of drawing up an agenda for a general disarmament conference under the auspices of the League.

Ever since the war the problem of disarmament has been of prime interest and importance to practically every country in the world. The calling of the Washington Conference of 1921-22 by the United States was an evidence of the interest of this country. In Europe the disarmament problem has been the subject of continuous discussions at Geneva. In practically all of the European discussions, the problem of security has been closely linked with disarmament; one school of thought, led by France, holding that security must precede any reduction of armaments, the other, led by Great Britain, insisting that security will logically follow reduction of armaments. The

history of these recent efforts to achieve a reduction or limitation of armaments is of particular interest at the present moment.

Many pertinent questions may be raised in connection with the meetings at Geneva. What basis is there for reaching an agreement on the further limitation of naval armaments between the United States, Great Britain and Japan? How does the French and Italian viewpoint on disarmament affect the position of the three principal naval powers as regards extension of the principles adopted at the Washington Conference? What is the extent of new naval construction undertaken by the leading naval powers since the Washington Conference? What progress has been made by the League of Nations' Preparatory Commission in clearing the ground for a general disarmament conference? What are the principal differences between the French, or the so-called Continental school of thought, and the opinions held by the United States and Great Britain?

This report is intended to provide an impartial summary of the disarmament policies of the five powers affected by the Washing-

ton Conference agreement and a brief review of the recent discussions which have taken place in Europe.

#### U. S. PROPOSAL FOR NAVAL CONFERENCE

In his note of February 10, addressed to the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments, President Coolidge asked these powers "whether they are disposed to empower their representatives at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission to initiate negotiations looking toward an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty." The President's memorandum stressed the usefulness of the discussions of the Preparatory Commission, but made it clear that the United States Government is primarily interested in the question of naval disarmament. Pointing out that "final solution for the problem of armament may not be immediately practicable," the President asked that the powers proceed "at once to the isolation or separate solution of such problems as may appear susceptible to such treatment,"—specifically, the extension of the Washington Conference 5-5-3 ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain and Japan to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. He suggested that the ratios of France and Italy be left to the discussions at Geneva, "taking into full account their special conditions and requirements in regard to the types of vessels in question."

By February 28, replies had been received from the four Powers. Those from Great Britain and Japan indicated a willingness to accept President Coolidge's suggestion while those from France and Italy rejected the proposal.

The French reply, received February 15, advanced three reasons which led the French Government to decline the American invitation to participate in a naval conference at this time:

1. That the American proposal might compromise the success of the work already begun at Geneva.
2. That it violates the principle of the equality of states by limiting the effort to a few powers, and
3. That it is contrary to the fundamental tenet of the French program of disarmament, namely, that limitation of land, air and naval armaments cannot be undertaken separately.

The Italian reply, received February 21, rejected the American proposal on the ground that the "undeniable interdependence between every kind of armament of every single nation" made it impossible to adopt partial measures applicable only to five great naval powers, that limitation of armament must be universal and that Italy "on account of her unfavorable geographic position cannot expose herself to any restriction of her naval armaments which are already insufficient for the needs of her defense." The Italian reply stated in addition that Italy "must take into account the other nations which . . . have access to the Mediterranean," and which have under construction many naval units of great importance."

#### TEXT OF BRITISH REPLY

The British reply, accepting the American proposal, was received on February 28. It read as follows:

"His Majesty's Government in Great Britain received with cordial sympathy the invitation of the Government of the United States of America to take part in a conversation at Geneva on the further limitation of naval armament.

"The view of His Majesty's Government upon the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communications and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies are well known, and together with the special conditions and requirements of the other countries invited to participate in the conversation must be taken into account.

"His Majesty's Government is nevertheless prepared to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be carried further either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various powers or in other important ways. They therefore accept the invitation of the Government of the United States of America and will do their best to further the success of the proposed conversation.

"They would, however, observe that the relationship of such a conversation to the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva would require careful adjustment."

The Japanese acceptance, received February 20, asked that the pourparlers be held not earlier than June 1st, in order to give

time for a special Japanese delegation to reach Geneva. It expressed satisfaction that the American Government had not put forward rigid proposals on the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the several powers and pointed out that, in order to insure the success of the proposed negotiations, it seems highly important that all parties should approach the subject with an open mind.

The willingness of Great Britain and Japan to participate in a new naval conference encouraged the United States Government to continue its efforts for limitation of auxiliary naval craft, despite the refusal of France and Italy to participate in a limited conference. Accordingly, on March 8, the United States proposed to Great Britain and Japan that a conference be held by the three nations at Geneva. Both countries accepted this second proposal and indicated that they would be willing to participate in a three-power conference.

Recognizing the desirability of securing at least the unofficial cooperation of France and Italy, the United States, on March 12, in acknowledging the British and Japanese acceptance, expressed the hope that France and Italy "may decide to be represented, at least in some informal capacity, at the conversations contemplated."

On March 14, the American Ambassadors in Paris and Rome presented to the French and Italian Governments respectively an invitation from President Coolidge to be represented in an informal manner at the proposed three-power conference. No definite reply has been received from either government as this report goes to press. Should France and Italy decline to participate even in an unofficial capacity, the Conference would be faced by very real difficulties, particularly in regard to submarines which France regards as vital to her security.

The position of the five governments on the general question of limitation of armaments is of primary importance, not only to the work of the Preparatory Commission, but to the limited naval conference proposed by the United States. The following summaries present, in condensed form, the views expressed by spokesmen for Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States at various times during the past few years.

#### DISARMAMENT POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN

The British position in regard to the general problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments has been clearly defined at the meetings of the Preparatory Commission in Geneva. It may be summarized as follows:

1. While the British believe that disarmament can only be obtained as a result of security, they feel that it is equally true that disarmament is the greatest guarantee of security. British representatives have stated that if the disarmament process can only be started, security will follow and make it possible to proceed with increasing rapidity to the further reduction of armaments. For this reason, Great Britain has expressed herself as anxious for disarmament as a condition of security.

As regards security, the following statement made by Viscount Cecil at a meeting of the Preparatory Commission amplifies the British position on this point:

"The cause of armament is undoubtedly in many cases (though not in all) a fear of danger to the national security. That involves country A keeping up armaments because it fears attack from country B. The fact that country A maintains its armaments causes an increase in the armaments of country B, and possibly in other neighbors of country A, and they in turn increase their armaments, and so the process goes on. From that point of view, there is no doubt that no remedy can be found except by some general scheme of disarmament."

2. The British are firmly of the opinion that any form of supervision or control of armaments by an international body is more calculated to foment ill-will and suspicion between States than to foster international confidence, which should be one of the more important aims of any agreement for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

3. The ultimate war forces of a country—the so-called war potential—can not in the British view, properly be classified as armaments, and are not capable of limitation. Thus the British define "trained reserves" as men who have received a military training and are under a legal liability to be recalled to the colors in case of mobilization.

4. The British Government has stated

that it is most anxious to reduce its expenditures in every possible way and that it is no less anxious to reduce its military, naval and air expenditures than its other commitments.

5. The British state that the size of their army does not depend in any respect on the strength of foreign armies, but that it is merely a garrison depending in size on British overseas commitments.

6. In regard to the navy, Viscount Cecil in the Preparatory Commission made clear the British position on this most important factor in their policy:

"In the case of the navy, there is no doubt a certain element of—I will not call it competition—but dependence on the size of other navies. That was very carefully considered from the point of view of certain kinds of ships at the Washington Conference, which ended in an agreement which was very warmly welcomed in my country. The Washington Conference, however, only dealt with certain kinds of ships. It is possible that further agreements may be made in respect of submarines and cruisers, but I ought to point out that the number of cruisers in the British navy is also largely a question of overseas commitments and not of the size of foreign navies, or only very slightly a question of their size. While the number of cruisers may therefore not come within the scope of the question, their size undoubtedly does, and there is no reason why by general agreement, the size of the cruisers should not be diminished."

7. The British consider an air force an offensive rather than a defensive arm of the service, and as such dependent on the size of the air forces maintained by other countries. They have stated officially that they "would welcome any agreement which would enable them to reduce those armaments."

#### FRENCH DISARMAMENT POLICY

The French view of the reduction and limitation of armaments is in sharp contrast to that of Great Britain, on almost all points. France has consistently maintained:

1. That security must be guaranteed by some form of military assistance against aggression as a necessary condition precedent to the reduction and limitation of armaments. As Paul Boncour has expressed it in the Preparatory Commission: "Every path we follow leads us back to the fundamental argument . . . that the limitation and the reduction of armaments are indis-

solubly bound up with the organization of economic and military assistance in time of war." . . .

"One of the essential objects of the reduction and limitation of armaments was to secure a position in which no country committing an aggression would be able to make head against the total forces which could be brought against it by the Members of the League acting conjointly in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant and of regional agreements as contemplated in Article 21."

2. That agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments must be guaranteed by an international inspection and control of the military establishments to ascertain whether treaty obligations were being faithfully executed.

3. That there exists a complete interdependence of armaments and that it is impossible fairly to deal with any single category (land, sea or air) without simultaneously dealing with the others.

4. That it is not sufficient to deal with the actual peace-time armaments of nations, but that industrial, financial, economic and other factors must be taken into account in any general scheme that may be drawn up. This is the thesis of the so-called "*potentiel de guerre*" or war potential, according to which a country's preparedness for war is, in the main, proportionate to that country's total resources, men, money and material available in time of war.

5. That any agreements on the limitation and reduction of armaments, in order to be effective, must be universal, and that there must be a single standard system applicable to all countries of the world.

6. That airplanes and submarines are essentially defensive armaments and that in the navy a certain maximum tonnage should be allowed each state to be used as the state pleases, according to its resources and needs in large or small ships. This is of course diametrically opposed to the theory of limitation by classes as exemplified by the Washington Conference treaties.

7. That, as in the case of the British Empire, France must have adequate protection of the means of communication between the mother country and her large empire, which is second only to that of Great Britain.



## ITALIAN DISARMAMENT POLICY

The Italian position concerning reduction and limitation of armaments corresponds in general to that of the French.

1. The Italian Government has stated frankly that because of her "unfavorable geographical position," Italy cannot "expose herself without grave danger to any restriction of her naval armaments, which are already insufficient for the needs of her defense." Furthermore, Italy feels that she must take into account the "other nations which look into and have access to the Mediterranean, which are particularly favored by their geographical position, threatening (Italian) lines of communication, or which have under construction many naval units of various types or are elaborating naval programs of great importance."

2. There is an undeniable interdependence between all classes of armaments and limitation of armament, in order to be efficacious, must be universal.

3. Iron, steel, coal, petrol and other materials are in reality arms, implements and apparatus of war. "When a country can rely on obtaining these resources in its own territory without being dependent upon foreign countries, we may say that it possesses the fundamental elements of defense on which all sense of security depends." The natural economic situation, including as well the agricultural wealth of a country and its geographical situation with regard to the main routes of supplies should be the basis of every estimate of peace-time armaments.

4. It is here that the Italian view-point differs from the French. Italy feels that any international inspection and control of armaments would only engender friction, would be technically ineffective and would give rise to very grave practical difficulties particularly as it considers that resources constitute an important part of armaments.

## JAPANESE POLICY

The disarmament policy of the Japanese Government, as revealed in the reply to President Coolidge's memorandum and in statements advanced at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission in Geneva, is

neither wholly in accord with the British view nor the French-Italian view. Japan has indicated:

1. That she is in accord with the fundamental principle that security and disarmament are interdependent.

2. That she is in general agreement with Great Britain and the United States in favoring regional disarmament as a step toward general disarmament.

3. That she agrees with France that any definition of armaments should include the war potential of a country.

4. That she believes the civil air force of any country must be taken into account in the limitation of military air forces.

5. That she is opposed to the French view which favors international supervision of armaments.

6. That she believes the various categories of armaments are capable of separate limitation.

## POSITION OF UNITED STATES

The position of the United States as regards the general problem of disarmament has been clearly stated by Secretary Kellogg in a letter of February 12, to Congressman Stephen G. Porter, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee.

"1. That there should be a direct approach to the questions of limitation and reduction of armaments without awaiting complicated measures for providing security, in the belief that the cause of security will be promoted through the reduction and limitation of armaments and the elimination of suspicion and ill-will which can be expected to follow.

"2. That, in order to be really effective, agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments must be founded upon respect for treaty obligations and a belief in the good faith of the contracting parties. It is our belief that any agreement founded upon distrust and providing for a machinery of inspection and control will not only fail to achieve its purpose, but will create new elements of suspicion and ill will.

"3. We believe that insistence upon a joint consideration of land, sea and air armaments will tend to render needlessly complicated the

task of a final conference and will tend to render more difficult achievement in regard to the limitation and reduction of any single category of armament. For that reason we feel that ultimate success lies along the line of isolating from the general problem as many concrete questions as possible and dealing with them in a direct and practical manner.

"4. We feel that the only practical approach to the question of the limitation and reduction of armaments is through dealing with visible armaments at peace strength. We feel that this is a relatively simple problem where we are dealing with known quantities and where, through the exercise of patience and good will, we can hope for constructive achievement. We feel, on the other hand, that any scheme involving the complicated and variable industrial, financial and economic factors would tend to inject a needless complication into the problem and render more difficult any hope of real achievement.

"5. It is our view that there is no possibility of devising a system for the limitation and reduction of armaments which could be made either applicable or acceptable to all the countries of the world and that any attempt to reach a solution would merely mean an indefinite postponement of achievement. We feel that land and air armaments constitute an essentially regional problem and that different solutions can best meet the needs of different regions; that naval armament can best be dealt with through direct agreement among a limited number of naval powers."

From the above summaries it will be noted that the American view differs fundamentally from the French view. The British position is in harmony with that of the United States on most questions, while the Italian position reflects that of France. The Japanese have agreed with the American and British theses on some points and the French and Italian on others.

A memorandum on the work of the Joint Commission (one of the League bodies concerned with disarmament on which the United States is not represented) was submitted by the United States to the Preparatory Commission on March 10. It restates the American position, amplifying to some

extent the views of the United States on the economic aspects of the problem with which the Joint Commission dealt especially. This memorandum, made public at Geneva on the eve of the present session of the Preparatory Commission, has served to emphasize the difference between the French and American viewpoints in regard to disarmament.

#### REVIEW OF LEAGUE DISARMAMENT ACTIVITY

The history of the League of Nations' activity in the field of disarmament brings out clearly the development of these conflicting schools of thought and the importance of the fundamental problem of security.

The League of Nations, under Article 8 of the Covenant, was charged with the problem of disarmament:

Article 8. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Various committees of the League have been at work on the problem ever since the League's inception in 1920. In 1922, the Third Assembly officially recognized the interdependence of security and disarmament in the famous Resolution XIV which definitely linked the two problems. Various plans and treaties have been put forward by the League, notably the "Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance" (1923) and the "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" (1924), both of which proved impossible of acceptance by the powers. Finally in 1925, the Sixth Assembly adopted resolutions requesting the Council to undertake a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments to be convened as soon as satisfactory conditions had been assured from the point of view of general security. As a result, the Committee of the Council undertook a general study of the problem of reduction and limitation of armaments, made

recommendations as to the composition and procedure of a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference and drafted the questions to be examined by this Commission.

The League Council at its thirty-seventh session, December 7 to 16, 1925, considered the report of the Committee of the Council, adopted the latter's scheme for the constitution of the "Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference" and adopted a list of seven questions prepared by the Committee of the Council to be submitted to the Preparatory Commission as the basis of the latter's work in preparing the agenda for a general conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments.

#### COMMISSIONS APPOINTED BY LEAGUE COUNCIL

The organizations instituted by the League Council to undertake preparatory studies for a disarmament conference were as follows:

1. **PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE**, which is to draw up proposals for the Council and to direct and coordinate all work preparatory to the Conference. Any state not represented on the Commission is entitled to submit memoranda on matters in which it is specially interested and to be heard in support of such memoranda.

The present members of the Preparatory Commission are: Argentine Republic,\* Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile,\* China, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Salvador, Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (Yugoslavia), Sweden and the United States. Its Chairman is M. Loudon (Netherlands) and its Vice-chairmen, M. de Brouckère (Belgium) and M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia).

2. **THE JOINT COMMISSION** deals especially with the economic aspects of the questions relating to disarmament. It is composed of members of the Economic, Financial and Transit Organizations of the League and of members of the Employers' and Workers' Groups of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization. It includes as

well a certain number of experts appointed by the Council, and may seek the advice of other experts.

3. **THE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL**. This is the Council itself constituted as a Committee. It deals with such disarmament questions as fall within the sphere of the League organizations rather than that of the Preparatory Commission. The United States not being a member of the League is not represented on either the Joint Commission or the Committee of the Council.

The invitations were sent out on December 12, 1926 and were accepted by all the states except the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which based its refusal on the fact that the meeting was to be held in Switzerland. At the Lausanne Conference in 1923, one of the Russian delegates was murdered and a Swiss court afterward acquitted the murderer. As a result Moscow has informed Geneva that she will not attend any conference held on Swiss soil.

The United States accepted, and Congress appropriated \$50,000 for the expenses of the delegation which comprised the following members:

#### 1. State Department

Hugh Gibson (head of the delegation)  
Allen W. Dulles  
Dorsey Richardson  
Alan Winslow

#### 2. Navy Department

Rear-Admiral Hilary P. Jones  
Rear-Admiral Andrew T. Long  
Captain A. Andrews

#### 3. War Department

Major-General Dennis Nolan  
Brigadier-General H. T. Smith  
Major George Strong

The Preparatory Commission met in Geneva from May 18 to May 26, 1926, and again on September 22 and 27.

#### WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

The Commission constituted two sub-commissions composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Commission and consequently expressing the opinion of their respective Governments. Sub-Commission A deals with military, naval and air questions, and its members are ex-

\* Added to the original list by the Council at its March, 1926, session.

perts in these fields. Major-General Nolan and Rear-Admiral Jones, assisted by the army, navy and air experts represent the United States on this Sub-Commission. Sub-Commission B deals with non-military questions which may be referred to it and is composed of a representative of each delegation to the Preparatory Commission. Sub-Commission B is authorized to refer any such question to any organizations or individuals it may see fit to consult, including in particular the Joint Commission. The two Vice-Presidents of the Preparatory Commission are the respective Chairmen of the Sub-Commissions A and B.

Besides constituting the two Sub-Commissions which were to do the major work of clearing the ground for a Disarmament Conference by the formulation of answers to the seven questions of the questionnaire, the Preparatory Commission itself in plenary sessions discussed the questionnaire, definitely assigning various points to the two technical Sub-Commissions and expressing opinions designed to clarify the questionnaire and aid the Sub-Commissions in their work.

#### **THE WORK OF SUB-COMMISSION A.**

Sub-Commission A held three sessions at Geneva; the first, from May 28 to July 6; the second from August 2 to September 9; and the third from September 27 to November 5, making in all 86 meetings. The reports of these meetings as well as those of the Preparatory Commission itself bring out clearly the immense complexity of the problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments and indicate throughout, the existence of a wide diversity of opinion on the important points.

In general it can be said that there are two distinct schools of thought; one supported by France, Poland and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania) with varying additional adherents; the other, put forward and supported by the United States, usually with the adherence of Great Britain and occasionally of various other states, particularly countries which maintained voluntary rather than conscript military service and which opposed the war potential theory of the Continental Powers.

The divergence of views was so fundamental that at a subsequent meeting of the plenary Preparatory Commission, held September 22 and 27, Mr. Gibson, the United States representative, introduced a resolution inviting Sub-Commission A to arrange for the results of its deliberations to be embodied in a final report containing, in respect of each question considered, the various technical replies to which it might be possible to reduce the opinions expressed during the discussions. The resolution further recommended that the delegations in favor of each reply and the arguments with which they supported their views be embodied in the report. This resolution was passed and acted upon by Sub-Commission A, whose report to the Preparatory Commission is a bulky document of some 176 pages, for the most part printed in parallel columns to give consistently the varying views expressed.

#### **DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONNAIRE**

While it is obviously impossible to review adequately the ground covered by the Sub-Commission or to indicate the positions taken on the points raised in the questionnaire, it may be useful to append the questions, with a brief statement indicating the wide scope of the discussion. The mere listing of the questions brings out the fact that the problem of disarmament is tremendously complex and involves many more factors than the mere size of the military establishments concerned.

##### **QUESTION I.**

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments?"

- (a) Definition of the various factors—military, economic, geographical, etc.—upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.
- (b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments (military, naval and air) the methods of recruiting, training, organizations capable of immediate military employment, etc.



The Sub-Commission was divided in its opinion as to the answer to this question. The long discussion brought out the fact that some delegates, notably the French, believed the expression "armaments" included all the general resources of a country, industrial, financial, economic and human. On the other hand, other delegates, such as the British and American maintained that resources of material and personnel cannot rightfully be classed as armaments.

#### LIMITATION OF PEACE-TIME ARMAMENTS

##### QUESTION II.

- (a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?
- (b) What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments?"

The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces: the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods: for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment or of any immediately mobilizable forces: the reduction of the length of active service; the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defense, etc.

The Preparatory Commission was of the opinion "that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country." On the other hand it affirmed "that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilization measures." It is interesting to note that on this point there was general agreement.

In general it may be said that Sub-Commission A agreed that "theoretically, limitations may be looked for in the following directions:

1. Land, sea and air effectives constantly available;

2. Length of voluntary or compulsory service;
3. Land, naval and air material in use and and in reserve;
4. Expenditure on training and the cost of materials for armaments as a whole;
5. Chemical preparation;
6. Aeronautical preparation;
7. Preparations for utilizing the merchant marine;
8. Industrial preparations in general."

"undertaken  
with a  
view to  
war"

The French school, however, stated definitely that "in the present state of security, it is not possible to limit the number of trained reserves and the quantity of material in reserve." The Americans, British and others took the opposite view of the possibility of limiting these factors.

#### STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT

##### QUESTION III.

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e. g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?

The Sub-Commission agreed that it was very difficult, if not impossible to compare forces as dissimilar as a professional army, on the one hand, and a conscript army on the other. Certain standards of comparison were discussed, some delegates, notably the British and American, believing that trained reserves and material in reserve could be taken as a standard of comparison; the French school of thought maintaining the exact opposite.

In regard to the measure of naval units, there were generally speaking, two divergent points of view: one group led by France, held that the total naval tonnage should form the basis of limitation, the other led by the United States, that the limitation should be effected by classes of ships.

In regard to air forces, the difference of opinion arose in regard to whether or not civil airplanes, material, personnel, etc.,

should be included in any estimate of the military air force of a state.

The Sub-Commission agreed in general that expenditure on national defense does not appear in present circumstances to constitute a standard of comparison for armaments. Some delegates, however, believed that such expenditures furnish an indirect standard of comparison.

The Sub-Commission recommended that the question of a reduction or limitation of armed forces by means of the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defense be studied further by the Joint Commission. This Commission found that it would first of all be necessary to introduce a standard system of budget accounting and of classification of the various categories of expenditures concerning national defense. It is this phase of the question which the Joint Commission is at present engaged in studying.

#### **"OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMAMENTS"**

##### **QUESTION IV.**

Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments? Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organized for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

The following armaments were, in the opinion of the Sub-Commission, "defensive armaments:" So-called "fixed defenses," such as forts, etc.; vessels of small sea-going efficiency under some conditions; permanent fortifications for defense against land attacks; anti-air craft apparatus.

In regard to the second half of the question, the Sub-Commission felt that "technically speaking, the smaller the quantity of mobile and up-to-date material, the smaller the number of immediately available trained effectives and mobilization facilities in a military system, the less will that system be suitable for aggressive purposes, taking into account such fundamental differences as may exist between armies recruited on the voluntary system and those recruited by con-

scription." Furthermore, some of the Sub-Commission felt that "the principal test whether a force is designed for purely defensive purposes or built up in a spirit of aggression remains in any case the intentions of the country concerned."

#### **FACTORS DETERMINING SCALE OF ARMAMENTS**

##### **QUESTION V.**

- (a) On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

Population;

Resources;

Geographical situation;

Length and nature of maritime communications;

Density and character of the railways;

Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centers near the frontiers;

The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments; The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?

- (b) Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?

Under Question V, the Sub-Commission considered but one item, the vulnerability of frontiers. Because of their political character the other questions under (a) were referred to Sub-Commission B, which later turned them over to the Joint Commission.

Part (b) had been the subject of important recommendations by the French, Polish and Finnish Governments which the Preparatory Commission referred the League Council.

France, in expressing her belief in the value of mutual assistance as a step toward disarmament, asked the commission to determine how such assistance could best be given.

The Polish delegation made the following proposal:

"The Commission suggests to the Council that it would be well to consider whether a special organization of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance)."

The delegation of Finland proposed:

"The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavorably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security."

#### CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT

##### QUESTION VI.

- (a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
- (b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?
- (c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

Most of the members of the Sub-Commission felt that there could be no distinction for the purposes of disarmament between civil and military aircraft. The German delegation strongly opposed this point of view.

The United States delegation declared that it did not agree with the alleged importance of civil aircraft in estimating the war-strength of a country, since it considered that civil aircraft is merely a resource of a country.

Part (c) of this question was answered in the affirmative with some divergence of opinion as to details.

#### REGIONAL DISARMAMENT

##### QUESTION VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

The Sub-Commission came to the general conclusion that "regarding this question from a technical point of view, regional military, naval and air disarmament may be looked upon as a step towards general disarmament, and this step will be more important in measure as the region considered is vaster and lends itself more readily to the technical organization of a system of possible mutual assistance guaranteeing each of the States of the region against any aggression." The United States dissented strongly from the last part of this statement (beginning "this step"), and declared that this part of the above conclusions largely negatives the idea of regional agreements.

A supplementary Question (VIII), as follows, was referred by the Preparatory Commission to Sub-Commission B:

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that 'the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments their military, naval and air programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

"With a view to organizing this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages from the military point of view of the various methods which might be employed and in particular:

- "(a) The organization at Geneva of a permanent service for the col-

lection of information received from the different Governments;

- “(b) The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and in general all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilized world.

“Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences from the military point of view of inserting in the Convention relative to Disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labor Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Treaty of Versailles).

“Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision.”

In regard to the last section of the Preparatory Commission's instructions, which form the most fundamental part of this supplementary question, the Sub-Commission was divided into two groups, one led by the United States and Great Britain expressing the opinion that “any form of supervision or control of armaments by an international body is more calculated to foment ill-will and suspicion between states than to foster in-

ternational confidence. . . . The execution of the provisions of any Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments must depend upon the good faith of nations scrupulously to carry out their treaty obligations.” The other school, supported by France, maintained that any disarmament treaty to be effective, must provide for the creation of an international body under the auspices of the League, to investigate the armaments maintained by any given state.

At its present session, which opened March 21 at Geneva, the Preparatory Commission will endeavor to prepare a final agenda for the general disarmament conference. In addition to considering the reports of its Sub-Committees A and B and of the Joint Commission, the Preparatory Commission has before it the draft of a convention introduced by Lord Cecil which embodies the British proposals for disarmament. Paul Boncour, the French representative on the Commission, has stated that he will shortly introduce another draft convention based on the French thesis for disarmament. Other delegations have indicated that they may do likewise.

It is the task of the Preparatory Commission to consider all of these proposals and to reconcile them, if possible, in a final draft convention which might be used as the basis of the work of the future disarmament conference. Whether the Preparatory Commission will be able to accomplish this task in time to submit recommendations to the Eighth Assembly of the League in September remains to be seen.

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## ANNEX I

## NAVAL ARMAMENTS OF THE FIVE POWERS

In view of the fact that the three-power conference proposed by the United States will endeavor to reach an agreement for limiting the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty, the present status as reached at the Washington Conference, and the present ratio in regard to cruisers, destroyers and other classes not limited at Washington, are of interest.

The Washington Conference, which met from November 11, 1921 to February 6, 1922, resulted in a treaty between the United States and the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, limiting naval armaments as regards capital ships and aircraft carriers.

According to the terms of this treaty the signatory powers agreed to establish the following ratio based on tonnage: For the United States, the British Empire and Japan 5-5-3; for France and Italy 1.67 for each country.

From the following tables it will be noted that since the Washington treaty the five powers have laid down a total of 235 vessels and appropriated for 60 more. The greatest building has been in cruisers, destroyers and submarines, with Great Britain and Japan leading in cruiser construction, Japan and France leading in destroyer construction, and France and Japan in submarines.

TABLE I—SHIPS SCRAPPED UNDER TREATY TERMS\*

Power	Ships completed		Ships building		Total	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons
United States.....	<sup>1</sup> 19	239, 580	<sup>2</sup> 13	552, 800	32	842, 380
British Empire.....	<sup>3</sup> 22	447, 750	None.	None.	<sup>3</sup> 22	447, 750
Japanese Empire.....	<sup>4</sup> 12	192, 751	<sup>4</sup>	161, 958	16	354, 709
France.....	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
Italy.....	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.

<sup>1</sup> Includes Oregon and Illinois permitted to be retained for noncombatant purposes.

<sup>2</sup> Includes Lexington and Saratoga which are being completed as aircraft carriers.

<sup>3</sup> Includes Collingwood and Colusus permitted to be retained for noncombatant purposes.

<sup>4</sup> Includes Asahi and Shikishima permitted to be retained for noncombatant purposes.

TABLE II—CAPITAL SHIPS (LIMITED)

Power	Built		Building		Tonnage to be arrived at in 1941	True ratio in 1941
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons		
United States.....	18	525, 850	None.	None.	525, 000	5.00
British Empire.....	22	530, 450	<sup>1</sup> 2	70, 000	525, 000	5.00
Japan.....	10	301, 320	None.	None.	315, 000	3.00
France.....	9	194, 544	None.	None.	175, 000	1.67
Italy.....	7	133, 670	None.	None.	175, 000	1.67

Nelson and Rodney building to replace Ajax, Centurian, King George V and Thunderer. When this replacement is effected capital ship tonnage for British Empire will be (20 ships) 558,950 tons.

British Empire and Japanese Empire retain four battle cruisers each, United States retaining none. When Nelson and Rodney are completed, the following status will obtain:

	United States	British Empire	Japanese Empire	France	Italy
Capital ships:					
Armed with 13.4-inch guns or heavier.....	14	20	10	3	0
Armed with 12-inch guns.....	4	0	0	6	7

\*Tables I-V prepared by U. S. Navy Department.

TABLE III—AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (LIMITED)

Power	Built <sup>1</sup>		Building		Total		Total of non-experimental carriers		Total tonnage allowed by treaty	Increment necessary to attain allowance (tons)
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons		
United States.....	1	12,700	2	66,000	3	78,700	2	66,000	135,000	69,000
British Empire.....	4	67,290	2	37,200	6	104,490	3	56,300	135,000	78,700
Japanese Empire.....	1	9,500	2	53,800	3	63,300	2	53,800	81,000	27,200
France.....	None.	None.	1	21,160	1	21,160	1	21,160	60,000	38,840
Italy.....	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	60,000	60,000

<sup>1</sup> All experimental with exception of British carrier Furious of 19,100 tons, completed September, 1925. Under terms of treaty experimental carriers may be replaced at any time provided total carrier tonnage is not exceeded.

TABLE IV—MODERN CRUISERS (UNLIMITED)

Power	Built		Building		Authorized and appropriated for		Total		Tonnage on basis of 5-5-3-1.67-1.67	To attain 5-5-3-1.67-1.67 ratio with Britain	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons		Number <sup>1</sup>	Tons
United States.....	10	75,000	2	20,000	3	30,000	15	125,000	332,290	21	207,290
British Empire.....	40	194,290	11	110,000	3	28,000	54	332,290	332,290	None.	None.
Japanese Empire.....	19	102,005	6	54,200	None.	None.	25	156,205	199,374	4	43,169
France.....	3	16,731	6	53,619	1	10,000	10	80,350	110,985	3	30,635
Italy.....	8	30,784	2	20,000	None.	None.	10	50,784	110,985	6	60,201

	United States	British Empire	Japanese Empire	France	Italy
Actual ratios, modern cruisers:					
Tonnage.....	1.88	5.00	2.35	1.20	0.76
Number of vessels.....	1.38	5.00	2.31	.93	.93
Capital ship ratio.....	5.00	5.00	3.00	1.67	1.67

TABLE V—DESTROYER TYPE, FIRST LINE (UNLIMITED)

Power	Built				Authorized and appropriated for or building				Total			
	Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons	Number	Tons
United States.....	None.	None.	1276	329,153	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	276	329,153
British Empire.....	<sup>2</sup> 18	31,310	<sup>2</sup> 169	194,575	None.	None.	2	2,540	18	31,310	171	197,015
Japanese Empire.....	None.	None.	78	85,650	4	7,400	14	20,230	4	7,400	92	105,880
France.....	4	9,144	20	20,062	9	22,647	25	36,560	13	31,791	45	56,622
Italy.....	8	14,889	20	18,111	None.	None.	15	19,112	8	14,889	35	37,223

	United States	British Empire	Japanese Empire	France	Italy
Actual ratios, modern destroyer types:					
Total combined tonnage.....	7.29	5.00	2.48	1.93	1.14
Total combined number of vessels.....	7.30	5.00	2.54	1.54	1.14
Capital ship ratio.....	5.00	5.00	3.00	1.67	1.67

TABLE VI—SUBMARINES (UNLIMITED)\*

Power	Built				Authorized and Appropriated for, or Building				Totals		Tonnage on present Japanese basis at 5:5:3: 1.67: 1.67 ratio
	No.	1,000 tons +	No.	700 tons +	No.	1,000 tons +	No.	700 tons +	No.	Tonnage	
U. S. ....	6	9,675	50	43,822	3	6,000	0	None	59	59,497	114,295
Brit. Emp. ....	7	11,350	28	25,150	9	12,215	1	890	45	49,605	114,295
Japan. ....	6	10,110	43	34,834	17	21,970	2	1,663	68	68,577	68,577
France. ....	3	2,988	19	17,509	4	10,010	19	26,621	45	57,128	41,146
Italy. ....	0	None	9	7,167	4	5,200	9	7,145	22	19,512	41,146

TABLE VII—NAVAL CONSTRUCTION SINCE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE\*

Type or Class	United States				British Empire				Japan				France				Italy			
	Laid Down		Total		Laid Down		Total		Laid Down		Total		Laid Down		Total		Laid Down		Total	
Capital Ships ....					2	2	70,000													
Aircraft Carriers ..	2	2	66,000		3	3	56,300	2	2	53,800			6	1	7	63,610	2	2	20,000	
Light Cruisers ....	2	3	50,000		11	3	138,000	12	12	88,285			1	1	1	4,000				
Mine Layers .....					1	1	6,740		1	1	3,000									
Destroyer Leaders ..									4	4	7,400		9	3	12	29,724				
Destroyers .....					2	2	2,540	27	8	35	46,400	22	4	26	37,994		16	16	20,136	
Submarines .....	3	3	(a) 2,119		3	6	12,215	21	9	30	38,664	32	11	43	47,871		13	13	12,345	
Gunboats .....	6	6	2,790		4	4	?	4	4	4	1,352		1	1	720					
Mine Sweepers .....								6	6	6	4,200						9	9	(c) 6,486	
Tankers .....								3	3	3	46,200	1	2	3	23,900		4	4	30,100	
Tenders .....					1	1	?	3	3	3	32,400		2	2	14,000		1	1	5,000	
Supply & Repair .....					1	1	?	1	1	1	17,500						1	1	8,140	
Totals .....	13	3	16	120,909	26	11	37	285,795	79	22	101	339,201	71	24	95	221,828	46	(d) 46	102,207	

(a) Does not include tonnage of 2 submarines. (b) Does not include tonnage of 4 gunboats, one repair ship and one submarine tender. (c) These are combined mine sweepers and mine layers. (d) No information.

## ANNEX II

## BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF DISARMAMENT

1919.

June 28. Treaty of Versailles.

Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Articles 164-273 of the Treaty of Versailles—disarm Germany.

September 10. Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye.

Articles 118-159—disarm Austria.

Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye for the control of the traffic in arms.

November 27. Treaty of Neuilly.

Articles 64-104—disarm Bulgaria.

1920.

May 14-19. The Permanent Advisory Committee on Military, Naval and Air questions appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

June 4. Treaty of Trianon.

Articles 102-143—disarm Hungary.

November 15-December 18. Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments appointed by the First Assembly of the League of Nations.

1921.

September 5-October 5. Second Assembly of the League of Nations asks the Temporary Mixed Commission to make proposals for the reduction of armaments.

1921-1922.

November 11-February 6. Washington Conference for the reduction of naval armaments.

February 6. Treaty between United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan.

Treaty between the same powers, in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.

September 4-30. Third Assembly of the League of Nations adopts Resolution XIV definitely linking disarmament and security.

December 2-22. Abortive disarmament conference at Moscow between the Soviet and Baltic Governments.

1922-1923.

December 4-February 7. Conference in Washington on Central affairs.

Convention for limitation of armaments between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica.

September 3-29. Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance recommended by the Fourth Assembly of the League.

1924.

February 14-25. Abortive international Naval Conference at Rome for the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaties to non-signatory States.

1924.

June. League Council submits Draft Treaty of

Disarmament and Security, prepared by an unofficial American group as an official League document.

September 1-October 2. Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations links arbitration with security and disarmament.

October 2. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

1925.

May 4-June 16. The League of Nations' International Conference for the adoption of a convention for the control of the traffic in arms. The United States officially represented.

September 7-26. Sixth League Assembly requests the Council to undertake a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

October 5-16. Locarno Conference.

December 1. Signature in London of Locarno security pacts.

December 7-16. The Council adopted the scheme of the Committee of the Council for a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and the disarmament questionnaire to be considered by the Preparatory Commission.

1926.

May 18-26. Preparatory Commission met in Geneva and appointed Sub-Commissions A and B. The United States was officially represented.

May 28-July 6. First Session of Sub-Commission A.

August 2-September 9. Second Session of Sub-Commission A.

September 27-November 5. Third Session of Sub-Commission A.

September 22 and 27. Second Session of the Preparatory Commission.

September 6-25. Resolution of Seventh Assembly asking the Preparatory Commission to speed up its work.

December 7-11. League Council requests Preparatory Commission to summon an International Conference as soon as possible.

1927.

January 31. Inter-Allied Commission of Control of German armaments withdrawn from Germany.

February 10. President Coolidge invites Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy to conference at Geneva to extend principles of Washington Conference to classes of ships not limited by the Washington Treaty.

March 21. Meeting of the Preparatory Commission.